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Abstract.  The “four-color” theorem seems to be generalizable 
as follows. The four-letter alphabet is sufficient to encode 
unambiguously any set of well-orderings including a 
geographical map or the “map” of any logic and thus that of 
all logics or the DNA (RNA) plan(s) of any (all) alive being(s).  
Then the corresponding maximally generalizing conjecture 
would state: anything in the universe or mind can be encoded 
unambiguously by four letters. 
That admits to be formulated as a “four-letter theorem”, and 
thus one can search for a properly mathematical proof of the 
statement.  
It would imply the “four colour theorem”, the proof of which 
many philosophers and mathematicians believe not to be 
entirely satisfactory for it is not a “human proof”, but 
intermediated by computers unavoidably since the necessary 
calculations exceed the human capabilities fundamentally. It is 
furthermore rather unsatisfactory because it consists in 
enumerating and proving all cases one by one. 
Sometimes, a more general theorem turns out to be much easier 
for proving including a general “human” method, and the 
particular and too difficult for proving theorem to be implied 
as a corollary in certain simple conditions. 
The same approach will be followed as to the four colour 
theorem, i.e. to be deduced more or less trivially from the 
“four-letter theorem” if the latter is proved. References are 
only classical and thus very well-known papers: their complete 
bibliographic description is omitted. 
Key words: alphabet of nature, four-color theorem, four-letter 
theorem, human proof versus “machine” proof, two-letter vs 
four-letter alhabet       
INTRODUCTION 
How many “letters” does the alphabet of nature need? Nature 
is maximally economical, so that that number would be the 
minimally possible one? 
One can approach the problem by the next question. What is 
the common in the following facts? 
(1) The square of opposition 
(2) The “letters” of DNA  
(3) The number of colors enough for any geographical map 
(4) The minimal number of points, which allows of them not 
be always well-ordered1   
The number of entities in each of the above cases is four 
though the nature of each entity seems to be quite different in 
each one. 
The first three facts share that to be great problems and thus 
generating scientific traditions correspondingly in logic, 
genetics, and mathematical topology. However, the fourth one 
(4) is almost obvious: triangle do not possess any diagonals, 
quadrangle is just what allows of its vertices not to be well-
ordered in general just for its diagonals. 
Thus the limit of three as well as its transcendence by four 
seems to be privileged philosophically, ontologically, and even 
theologically: It is sufficient to mention Hegel’s triad, Peirce’s 
or Saussure’s sign, Trinity in Christianity, or Carl Gustav 
Jung’s discussion about the transition from Three to Four in the 
archetypes in “the collective unconscious” in our age. 
One suggestion might be: The base of all cited absolutely 
different problems and scientific traditions is just (4). Thus the 
                                                 
1 Here and bellow, the term of well-ordering as to cyclic orderings 
means the option any point in those to be able to be chosen as the 
square of opposition can be related to those problems and 
interpreted both ontologically and differently in terms of each 
one of the cited scientific areas as well as in a few others. 
Here are a few arguments: 
(A1) Logic can be discussed as a formal doctrine about 
correct conclusion, which is necessarily a well-ordering from 
premise(s) to conclusion(s). To be meaningful, that, to which 
logic is applied, should not be initially well-ordered just for 
being able to be well-ordered as a result of the application of 
logical tools. 
(A2) Consequently, the initial “map” (to which logic is 
applied) should be “colored” at least by four different types of 
propositions, e.g. those kinds in the square of opposition. They 
are generated by two absolutely independent binary 
oppositions: “are – are not” and “all – some”, thus resulting 
exactly in the four types of the “square”. 
(A3) Five or more types of propositions would be redundant 
from the discussed viewpoint since they would necessary iff the 
set of four entities would be always well-orderable, which is 
not true in general. 
(A4) Logic can be discussed as a special kind of encoding 
namely that by a single “word” thus representing a well-ordered 
sequence of its elementary symbols, i.e. the letters in its 
alphabet. The absence of well-ordering needs at least four 
letters to be relevantly encoded just as many (namely four) as 
the “letters” in DNA2 or the minimal number of colors 
necessary for a geographical map. 
“beginning”, i.e. as the least element in well-ordering. This corresponds 
to the prohibition of „vicious circle” in logic.  
2 They are: adenine (A), guanine (G), cytosine (C), and thymine (T). 
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(A5) The alphabet of four letters is able to encode any set, 
which is neither well-ordered nor even well-orderable in 
general, just to be well-ordered as a result eventually involving 
the axiom of choice in the form of the well-ordering principle 
(theorem). It can encode the absence of well-ordering as the gap 
between two bits, i.e. the independence of two fundamental 
binary oppositions (such as both “are – are not” and “all – 
some” in the square of opposition). 
A more rigorous, logical and mathematical introduction into 
the problem might be the following 
All logics seem to be unifiable as different kinds of rules for 
conclusion. Thus any logic is a set of correct well-orderings 
(i.e. sequences from the premise to the conclusion). The 
axiomatic description of logic consists in explicating the 
characteristic property of that set so that one can decide for any 
well-ordering whether it belongs or not to that set. To be a well-
ordering ‘correct’ means just that it belongs to the set defined 
by its characteristic property as a certain kind of logic. 
Then, the characteristic property of the set of all logics 
seems to be the set of all sets of well-orderings in a class 
identifiable as language as a whole. The advantage of that 
definition is that one can “bracket” (in a Husserlian manner) the 
latter class being too fussy, unclear, and uncertain. It is 
substituted by the set of all natural numbers perfectly sufficient 
for representing all well-orderings. Indeed, this is the sense of 
the well-ordering principle equivalent to the axiom of choice. 
The initial class of language can be interpreted as what is 
enumerated, then “bracketed” and “forgotten”. This follows the 
essence (though not the “letter”) of Gödel’s approach for the 
arithmetical “encoding” of  
If all logics as that set of all sets of well-orderings of natural 
numbers are granted, one can define the concept of the ‘map’ 
of any given logic as the graph of all correct conclusions in the 
logic at issue. The vertices of the graph are natural numbers. 
Just four colors are enough to be colored that graph so that any 
two neighboring vertices to be colored differently according to 
the direct corollary from the “four-color” theorem. Then the 
maps of all logics share the same property. One can choice any 
four certain and disjunctive “colors” for all maps, e.g. those of 
the square of opposition according to the tradition, or the “A-
C-G-T” alphabet of DNA. Nature always simplifying 
maximally has also “proved” the “four-color” theorem as to 
DNA.  
 The “four-color” theorem seems to be generalizable as 
follows. The four-letter alphabet is sufficient to encode 
unambiguously any set of well-orderings including a 
geographical map or the “map” of any logic and thus that of all 
logics or the DNA (RNA) plan(s) of any (all) alive being(s).  
Then the corresponding maximally generalizing conjecture 
would state: anything in the universe or mind can be encoded 
unambiguously by four letters. 
That admits to be formulated as a “four-letter theorem”, and 
thus one can search for a properly mathematical proof of the 
statement.  
It would imply the “four colors theorem”, the proof of which 
many philosophers and mathematicians believe not to be 
entirely satisfactory for it is not a “human proof”, but 
intermediated by computers unavoidably since the necessary 
calculations exceed the human capabilities fundamentally. It is 
furthermore rather unsatisfactory because it consists in 
enumerating and proving all cases one by one. 
Sometimes, a more general theorem turns out to be much 
easier for proving including a general “human” method, and the 
particular and too difficult for proving theorem to be implied as 
a corollary in certain simple conditions. 
The same approach will be followed as to the four colors 
theorem, i.e. to be deduced more or less trivially from the “four-
letter theorem” if the latter is proved. 
THE GENERAL IDEA, PLAN AND METHOD 
FOR THE FOUR LETTERS THEOREM TO 
BE PROVED  
The general plan for proving the theorem rests on a certain 
mathematical structure, its properties and interpretations. It is 
the separable complex Hilbert space, which is a universal 
mathematical structure in the following sense. It can unify 
nature by the its interpretation in the scientific doctrine of 
quantum mechanics, on the one hand, cognition and thus mind 
as both rest on some kind of logic in a broad sense, on the other 
hand. One can add a third universality, that of the self-
foundation of mathematics even in the Pythagorean framework 
including reality within itself. 
Hilbert space is a vector space closed to a scalar product, 
infinitely dimensional in general. If it is separable, this means 
that the number of its “axes” is countable without utilizing the 
axiom of choice. If it is complex, this means that it is defined 
on the field of complex numbers, and its axes are topologically 
compact internally, e.g. as a usual 3D ball. It consists of two 
identical dual spaces mutually disjunctive as any two dual 
spaces. This involves the concept of choice in its base for 
a choice between two disjunctive and equally probable 
alternatives is necessary to determine which of both dual spaces 
is meant. That kind of choice is an elementary choice, a bit, the 
unit, in which the quantity of information is measured. Thus 
both concept and quantity of information are inherently 
involved in the structure of Hilbert space and in the separable 
complex Hilbert space particularly. 
Identity to the choice of each one dual Hilbert space implies 
still one extraordinary property: the invariance to the axiom of 
choice and thus, to well-ordering. The former is widely utilized 
in quantum mechanics as the identity of a coherent state to the 
corresponding statistical ensemble and interpretable 
ontologically as a kind of invariance to the possible and actual. 
The latter, the equivalent invariance to well-ordering is not 
widely used yet, but can be utilized to unify all logics, their 
relation to the non-logical in a broad sense as the non-ordered 
including both any unordered mental contains and any natural 
staff such as matter and energy and what may consist of them. 
The separable complex Hilbert space admits a few 
mathematical interpretations essential for the applications in 
physics, which will be considered in the next section in detail. 
However, one of them, that in terms of quantum information 
refers directly to the plan how the theorem may be proved as 
well as to the foundation of mathematics, and more especially 
to the relation of finiteness and infinity. 
In fact, the common framework of set theory (including the 
axiom of choice) and Peano arithmetic (including the axiom of 
induction) is not absolutely consistent if one admits 
arithmetizability in the sense of one-to-one mappings between 
infinite sets and sets of natural number. Indeed, any set of 
natural number should be finite for the following argument: 1 
3 
 
is finite; adding 1 to any finite number, another finite number 
is obtained; consequently, all natural numbers are finite 
according to the axiom of induction. 
On the contrary, set theory postulates the existence of 
infinite sets (e.g. the “axiom of infinity” in ZFC even utilized 
the same construction as the axiom of induction), however any 
contradiction does not appear for the axiom of induction is not 
an axiom in set theory. If one unifies set theory and Peano 
arithmetic, a contradiction appears as to infinity for the former 
postulates it, and the latter excludes it by the axiom of 
induction. The so-called Gödel inconsistency argument (1930) 
elucidates that discrepancy in the common framework of set 
theory and Peano arithemetic. It is not too difficult to be 
removed, e.g. by replacing induction by transfinite induction as 
Gentzen (1936, 1938) or by Heyting arithmetic in an 
intuitionist manner.  
Furthermore, one third way may be outlined by Skolem’s 
conception about the “relativeness of the notion of ‘set’” (1922) 
conserving the framework of Peano arithmetic (with the axiom 
of induction) and set theory (with the axiom of choice). That 
pathway has the advantage to be both intuitively clear and 
linking the concepts of probability distribution, naturally 
representable in the separable complex Hilbert space as its 
equivalent characteristic function, and those of finite natural 
numbers and infinite sets. Once that pathway is marked, both 
above ones, by transfinite induction or by Heyting arithmetic, 
may be described as equivalent to it. However, one can 
emphasize expressively that neither transfinite induction nor 
Heyting arithmetic, nor any equivalents of them will be 
utilized. The proof is intended rigorously in the framework of 
Peano arithmetic and set theory.   
The concept of information, and particularly, of quantum 
information is directly connected to that of probability. Indeed, 
the concept of an elementary choice between two equally 
probable alternatives is shared by both concepts of information 
and probability correspondingly as a bit of information and as 
an elementary event in the space of events, in which probability 
can be defined by Kolmogorov’s axioms. Indeed, the choice 
between any alternatives, which are a finite number, can be 
always represented as a series of binary choices. 
The essential generalization of ‘choice’ is to be admitted for 
an infinite set of alternatives therefore involving the axiom of 
choice. That generalization of a bit of information is a qubit of 
quantum information. The way for ‘qubit’ to be introduced in 
quantum mechanics as the normed superposition of two 
orthogonal subspaces of the separable complex Hilbert space is 
equivalent to the above definition. Then, the separable complex 
Hilbert space can be represented as a series of “empty” qubits, 
and any element of as a record of a certain value in each qubit. 
The separable complex Hilbert space might be likened to the 
free variable of quantum information, any record of a “wave 
function” corresponds to its bound variable. The opposition and 
transition from ‘free variable’ to ‘bound variable’ features 
furthermore the concept of information.  
Further, one needs Skolem’s relativeness to represent any 
qubit as finite sequences of bits though purely and 
mathematically by virtue of the axiom of choice: 
The axiom of choice in the common framework of set theory 
and Peano arithmetic implies that relativeness of finiteness and 
infinity as follows. Any set can be well-ordered and thus 
enumerated and represented by an initial segment of natural 
numbers. However, all natural numbers are finite in virtue of 
the trivial deduction demonstrated above as well as all initial 
segments of natural numbers. Consequently, the axiom of 
choice implies a one-to-one mapping of any infinite set to some 
finite set. However, one can state only a pure existence of that 
correspondence therefore excluding any constructive way in a 
narrow sense to be demonstrable.  
That fact can be interpreted as a probability distribution for 
all initial segments of natural numbers to be attached to any 
infinite set even unambiguously. That unambiguous attachment 
of a probability distribution rather than a certain finite set can 
be anyway considered as a constructive way in a broad sense as 
to the above pure existence in virtue of the axiom of choice. 
However, that assumption is not necessary for the proof though 
it is consistent to it. Skolem’s relativeness is absolutely 
sufficient.  
Then any qubit can be represented as a finite though 
unknown series of bits. Any element of the separable complex 
Hilbert space consisting of some finite number of qubits, each 
of which in turn representable as a finite series of bits, is some 
finite though unknown series of bits. 
Any element of those series of bits consists of a pair of 
complementary bits, each one for each one of the two dual 
Hilbert spaces. Both bits being disjunctive (or 
“complementary” in terms of quantum mechanics) can share 
one and the same two “letters” e.g. such as “0” and “1”. Still 
two signs are necessary in the meta-level for the two bits of the 
pair to be able to be distinguished from each other: totally four. 
Consequently, four different letters are necessary for the 
alphabet of the separable complex Hilbert space 
Any state of any physical system might be exhaustedly 
described by a wave function, i.e. by an element of the 
separable complex Hilbert space, which in turn needs four 
“letters” to be recorded as an unambiguous string. 
Consequently, any physical entity needs alphabet of four letters 
to be written down and distinguished from any other physical 
entity. 
One can admit that any mental entity also needs not more 
than four letters for its alphabet as far as mind reflects the 
physical world. Anyway that is a speculative philosophical 
hypothesis, and a direct proof would be preferable.  
That direct proof can rest on the assumption that any mental 
entity or phenomenon is also cognizable by science and human 
knowledge as those in the physical world. Being cognizable, 
they should be representable as a certain consistent text. That 
text being right consistent should share certain rules of 
consistency, or a certain logic of some kind. Any logic 
generates a class of true proving sequences which are well-
ordered from the premises to the conclusions. All other 
sequences including those belonging to different logics are 
interpreted as false in the framework of the logic at issue. 
What is well-ordered by that logic, as it refers to that, a text 
to be represented consistently, are some units of meaning such 
as propositions, words, etc. belonging to language and even to 
a certain language of some kind. Those units may always be 
enumerated in virtue of the axiom of choice even where the 
contextual links between them are arbitrarily many and 
arbitrarily strong. Then all logics will be different sets of series 
of natural numbers well-ordered in a way different from the 
natural one in general. Any logic is the characteristic property, 
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explicating the rules of conclusion and logical implying, of the 
corresponding set of well-ordered series of natural numbers. 
Furthermore, one needs to demonstrate that any logic can be 
described as an element of the separable complex Hilbert space 
and as that describable by four letters.   
Indeed, any logic being represented as a set of well-
orderings (eventually of natural numbers) corresponds though 
not unambiguously to a single wave function, e.g. as the 
statistical ensemble of natural numbers after all well-orderings 
of the logic at issue are mixed. That corresponding wave 
function can be exhaustedly represented by four letters 
according to the previous consideration. Consequently, the set 
of all logics corresponding to that wave function can be 
represented also by four letters. Furthermore, those logics are 
disjunctive to each other as different ways one and the same 
text (sharing one and the same natural numbers) to be 
represented consistently i.e. as a set of well orderings. If they 
would not be disjunctive, the absence of contradiction in their 
intersection (being a nonempty set) cannot be guaranteed, and 
the text would not be represented consistently. 
Even any physical or mental entity to be representable 
thoroughly by four letters as this is already sketched above, the 
theorem is not yet a universal statement for some entity neither 
physical nor mental might anyway exist. Indeed, the theorem is 
valid under the condition of Peano arithmetic and set theory, 
but Gödel proved (1931) the existence of undecidable 
statements under the same condition.  
In other words, one needs a proof of completeness somehow 
distinguishing the case from Gödel’s incompleteness argument. 
This would be realized in a few ways.  
The one of them is to be demonstrated that Gödel’s theorem 
(“Satz VI”, 1931) obeys its own condition and thus it is self-
applicable (Penchev 2010). This means that its validity implies 
its undecidability: its status should be that of an axiom, a meta-
mathematical axiom about the existence of reality external to 
mathematics, which can be as accepted as rejected. Then, 
Gödel’s proof would transform its meaning into a proof of 
independence to the axioms of Peano arithmetic and set theory.  
That mathematics accepting the axiom of existence of reality 
external to mathematics may be called Gödel mathematics. 
That mathematics rejecting the axiom as a mathematical one 
may be called Hilbert mathematics in honour of Hilbert and his 
program about the self-foundation of mathematics. 
Consequently, Gödel’s incompleteness argument demonstrates 
only that Hilbert’s program cannot be accomplished if any 
reality external to mathematics exists. However, that condition 
is implicitly presupposed in Gödel’s argument (1931). If it is 
removed, “Satz VI” is unprovable in the sense that its 
provability implies its non-provability. 
Another way for distinguishing from Gödel’s 
incompleteness argument is by elucidating that the pair of 
Peano arithmetic (including the axiom of induction) and set 
theory (including the axiom of choice) are inconsistent to each 
other as to infinity. Indeed, the axiom of induction implies that 
all natural numbers are finite, set theory (e.g. the “axiom of 
infinity”) states the existence of (actual) infinity, and the axiom 
of choice generates a one-to-one mapping between any infinite 
set and some subset of the set of all natural numbers, which is 
necessarily finite because of the axiom of induction. 
Then Gödel’s incompleteness argument means the 
following. Any system containing Peano arithmetic is 
incomplete to set theory for the former does not admit infinite 
natural numbers while the latter admits infinite sets, and the 
axiom of choice guarantees for them to be enumerable. If Peano 
arithmetic is merely complemented by infinite natural numbers, 
it turns out to be inconsistent for any infinite natural number 
contradicts to the axiom of induction. 
The practice and tradition of mathematics demonstrates that 
infinity is necessary for its complete exhibition. This supposes 
the axiom of induction in Peano arithmetic to be somehow 
generalized, e.g. directly, by transfinite induction, or indirectly, 
by Heyting arithmetic. In each of both frameworks, Gödel’s 
incompleteness argument is invalid.  
One can easily show the way of the “axiom of reality” is 
accepted or rejected correspondingly in the pair of Peano 
arithmetic and set theory vs. the pair of the modified Peano 
arithmetic (either as Heyting arithmetic or by transfinite 
induction) and set theory: 
 In the former, the concept of infinity is external to Peano 
arithmetic, and the set theory itself, including it, represents 
reality within mathematics. Any mathematical model is 
“Gödelized” as some subset of the set of all natural numbers. A 
fundamental gap between it and reality in mathematics 
represented in set theory exist always right for the concept of 
infinity. 
In the latter, either the infinity itself (by means of transfinite 
induction) or the gap between finiteness and infinity (by 
Heyting arithmetic) is internal for the mathematical model also 
arithmetical in the final analysis. So, any difference rather than 
only the gap between model and reality is removed and 
therefore reality is not more external to mathematical model. 
The separable complex Hilbert space can be also considered 
as a relevant generalization of Peano arithmetic so that any 
inconsistency between it and set theory is removed, and 
mathematical model and reality coincide in a Pythagorean 
manner. 
Indeed, the separable complex Hilbert space can be 
considered as that generalization of Peano arithmetic where 
natural numbers are substituted by qubits. Furthermore, the 
proofs about the absence of hidden variables in quantum 
mechanics resting only on a few relevant properties of the 
separable complex Hilbert space can be considered as a proof 
of completeness as to that space. Any hidden variable would 
mean a certain nonzero difference between model and reality. 
The completeness of the separable complex Hilbert space 
can be also demonstrated immediately in terms of the above 
consideration by Skolem’s “relativity” (1922) representing the 
difference between any infinite set and the finite set of all 
natural as a certain probability distribution. That probability 
distribution implies a wave function as its characteristic 
function. Thus any difference between the separable complex 
Hilbert space and set theory turns out to be an element of the 
former and therefore included in it and removed as in the cases 
of transfinite induction or Heyting arithmetic. 
One can question which mathematics, either Hilbert or 
Gödel one, is the relevant as to our being. The philosophical 
term of ‘being’ should be preferred rather than of ‘reality’ for 
the two mathematics differ from each other right by its relation 
to reality.  
As far as quantum mechanics is a universal physical theory 
exception of which are not yet observed, Hilbert mathematics 
is that of our being. 
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One can conclude that the four letters theorem as well as the 
four colours theorem as far as and if the former implies the 
latter are valid in Hilbert mathematics. As to Gödel 
mathematics, the problem needs an additional discussion, 
which follows.  
The separable complex Hilbert space is shared by Hilbert 
mathematics and by Gödel mathematics. However, the former 
accepts it as the most fundamental mathematical structure, that 
arithmetic, which is able to generalize the Peano one in a way 
to underlie both mathematics and reality in the framework of 
mathematical being in a Pythagorean manner. 
The latter considers it as one among the many mathematical 
structure, which cannot be featured in any way. Thus, it can 
serve as a model of Hilbert mathematics in the framework of 
Gödel mathematics. The existence of that kind of model can 
serve as the relative consistency of Hilbert mathematics: it is 
not less consistent than Gödel mathematics.   
What distinguishes the two uses of the separable complex 
Hilbert space in each one mathematics is one condition which 
can be called the “axiom of completeness”, respectively the 
“axiom of incompleteness” as to Gödel mathematics. That 
axiom admits at least a few more or less equivalent 
formulations, some of which have been already mentioned 
above: transfinite induction, Heyting arithmetic, and the 
unambiguous representation of any infinite set as a certain 
probability distribution whether of all initial segments of 
natural numbers or of all finite sets. The latter rests on Skolem’s 
“relativeness of set” after the axiom of choice. 
That relativeness is essentially used in the proof of the four 
letters theorem for reducing any qubit to a finite series of bits. 
However, the additional condition, which is properly 
equivalent to the “axiom of completeness” is not used. 
Furthermore, the Skolem relativeness is valid in Gödel 
mathematics as far as the axiom of choice is valid. 
Consequently, the four letters theorem is both valid and proved 
in Gödel mathematics. 
Two questions are to be discussed about the four colours 
theorem: 
1. Does the four letters theorem imply it as in Hilbert 
mathematics as in Gödel mathematics? 
2. Can it be directly proved in Gödel mathematics even if 
need be not? 
As to Hilbert mathematics, (1) the four colours theorem is 
implied trivially for the middle different from the physical 
world and mind, both representable absolutely in the separable 
complex Hilbert space does not exist fundamentally. 
Furthermore, (2) one can directly represent any “geographical 
map” as a well-ordering of all areas in it. Then, the same well-
ordering is valid also if any area is substituted by the group of 
all areas having a common border with the corresponding area 
at issue including itself. Then any group of those, whether a 
physical quantum system or an imaginary map in mind, can be 
represented by four letters, which might be interpreted as four 
colours. 
As to Gödel mathematics, the argument (1) above is invalid. 
One would need an additional proof that the four colours 
theorem is not an undecidable statement. Any direct proof of 
the four colour theorem can be considered as that proof of 
decidability. As the “computer proof” of the four colour 
theorem is a direct one, it implies also that the above argument 
is a valid proof in Gödel mathematics. Then the “computer 
proof” can be even removed similar to Wittgenstein’s “stairs” 
for the above argument itself have already been a direct proof 
implying itself. Anyway that seems to be rather doubtful being 
too similar to a “vicious circle”. 
The argument (2) seems to be valid as far as the “map” exists 
in the world or in mind. However, the being of the “map” 
otherwise is both unprovable and irrefutable in Gödel 
mathematics. 
Those considerations impose rather the necessity of a direct 
deduction of the four colours theorem from the four letters 
theorem without any referring to the axiom of completeness or 
any relative condition. 
One rather elegant and instructive way for that direct 
deduction is the above “method of Wittgenstein’s stairs” to be 
perfected by demonstrating, figuratively speaking, the fact that 
after removing the “stairs”, one is still able to “leap down” and 
that the proper statement of the four colours theorem consists 
just only in that “jump down” independently of the way, in 
which that one has turn out to “be up”. That construction 
follows: 
The proof rests on the difference between induction and 
transfinite induction (bar induction). However, transfinite 
induction implies completeness for mathematics and thus it is 
inherent in Hilbert mathematics while the task now is the 
theorem to be proved also in Gödel mathematics. So, transfinite 
induction will be used only as a “Wittgenstein stairs” to be 
removed in the ultimate construction grounded only on the 
axiom of choice, which is admissible in Gödel mathematics.  
Constructing a “Wittgenstein stairs” consists in 
decolourizing the map coloured by four colours under 
conditions of the four colour theorem to a single colour (among 
the initial four ones). That construction needs the transfinite 
induction. The intention is to be utilized the corresponding 
reverse process for colouring the one-colour map into four 
colours under the conditions of the four colours theorem. In that 
reverse direction, the axiom of choice is what necessary rather 
than transfinite induction. The axiom of choice corresponding 
to transfinite induction in that reverse direction is available in 
Gödel mathematics unlike transfinite induction generating 
completeness and therefore involving Hilbert mathematics. 
Transfinite induction is applied between two domains of 
different colour. All domains are enumerated by the axiom of 
choice. Because Peano arithmetic is finite, any enumeration 
remains within each one corresponding domain. So one obtains 
a set of well-orderings, thus a logic and a certain wave function 
as above. Wave function can be represented by 4 letters. 
Consequently, all domain is designable by four letters. (The 
topological structure is describable by a wave function, the 
wave function by four letters, thus the topological structure is 
describable by four letters.) 
One can remove the meditation of wave function for it 
represents the relation between the inductions. The necessary 
algorithm is for example the following:  
If two neighbouring areas are versicolour, they can be 
unified in a single domain with either of the two colours. One 
uses any of both. The process continues.  
The process stops if it colours two neighbouring areas in one 
and the same colour. Then, it returns to the previous level and 
continues again.  
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The map can be called by any natural number of different 
colours initially. Nevertheless, the described algorithm will 
decolorize the map to a single colour always. 
 Indeed, if the process reach two neighbouring one-color 
domains, this is reduction ad absurdum as to the given way of 
colouring.  
If the process met the same problem in the last case, this 
means that induction and transfinite induction can be identified 
at least in one case of transfinite transition, which is false3. This 
is reduction ad absurdum about the premise that the process can 
stop before it to colour all domain in one colour.  
The process is also well describable by bar induction: It 
states that exists at least one branch which leads from any area 
to the first, initial area from which the process starts. 
The above description about checking whether the process 
can anyway continue in a certain other branch of the tree of the 
process is necessary only to express clearly relativeness or 
equivalence of the pair of transfinite induction and Peano 
induction (or merely transfinite induction if one accepts that 
transfinite induction includes Peano induction) to intuitionist 
bar induction. The intended algorithm will work without 
returning to any previous branch. However, it can be directly 
referred to bar induction because of the above equivalence. 
The problem is why the minimal number of colours should 
be four. The intention is to be demonstrated that the algorithm 
of decolorizing needs at least four letters though the number of 
initial colours in the map is arbitrary under the condition that 
any two neighbouring domains are coloured differently. Then, 
one can utilize the fact that both (transfinite) induction and the 
(axiom of) choice identify the result and process though in 
“opposite directions”: 
Induction accepts the process as given and then postulates 
the result as equivalent. Choice accepts that result as given and 
restores a process (well-ordering) as equivalent to the set 
eventually resultative by induction. 
Thus, if either of the process and result needs four “letters” 
for its “alphabet”, and both are identified, then the other of the 
process and result will need also four “letters” for its 
“alphabet”. 
One can utilize the property of Hilbert space to be 
compounded by two identical mutually dual spaces. One orders 
the map in one string by two colours. If two neighbouring 
domains turn out to be one-color, one can utilize a second string 
(this exists as far as the map is not well-ordered), so that if the 
two neighbouring domains turn out to be one-color, their 
corresponding domains in the second string are versicolor. 
Obviously less than four colours cannot realize that structure: 
two colours for each of the disjunctive two binary strings as 
being disjunctive they can share the same two colours; still two 
“meta-colours” to be distinguished the two disjunctive binary 
strings from each other; i.e. totally four colours.  
If any string is representable in thus, the process cannot stop 
before to colour the domain one-colour because it continues in 
either of the two branches above.   
Then the answer of why four colours are sufficient can be 
sketched as follows:  
                                                 
3 The finite and transfinite might be identified in virtue of Skolem’s 
relativity of the finite and infinite, but that identification can exist 
only “purely” while the meant case would be concrete referring to a 
The sense of removing the bound between two versicolor 
areas is transfinite induction. Indeed, the points of the one area 
are enumerated by one induction, those of the other one by 
another induction. Both inductions divided by the border 
between the two areas can be unified only by transfinite 
induction, which is defined as able to accomplish any 
transfinite transition, e.g. such as between two different 
inductions. 
Its dual operation in the context of the problem is the 
opposite case: where a bound between two one-color areas exist 
ceasing the process of decolorizing of the map area by area. The 
corresponding correcting operation is the change of the colour 
of the second area so that the barrier between it and the former 
one to make sense. Once that latter operation is accomplished, 
the former one can be accomplished in turn, too. 
So, the process can be algorithmically described by two 
disjunctive operations and a meta-operation switching between 
both. The first disjunctive operation is: “write the value of 
colour of the 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡ℎ area in the (𝑛𝑛 + 1)𝑡𝑡ℎ one if these values are 
different initially”. The second disjunctive operation is; 
“change the value of colour (𝑛𝑛 + 1)𝑡𝑡ℎ one if these values are 
equal initially”. The meta-operation is: “if any of both 
disjunctive operations strops, switch to the other operation. 
These three operations can be described by three Turing 
machines, each one of which corresponds to exactly one 
operation of the above three ones. They cannot be unified by a 
less number of machines because a Turing machine cannot 
know whether or where it will stop. Any stop needs a meta-
level for its description or processing. That kind of a pair 
Turing machines mutually activating each other by means of 
the stop of the other can be called complementary. 
These three Turing machines needs four different “digitals” 
or “colours” for them to work: The first pair of “colours” for 
both disjunctive machines for they work never together in 
definition and thus can share economically one and the same 
pair of colours. The meta-machine is what needs the second 
pair of colours. 
The second stage consists in removing the “Wittgenstein 
stairs”: the above four-letter algorithm for decolourizing any 
map to a single colour needs right just four letters and it is able 
to decolourize any map. Furthermore, the essence of both 
transfinite induction and axiom of choice is the identification 
the process and result including as to any infinite set. The 
difference between them consists in the opposite directions of 
identifying: transfinite induction accepts the process as given 
and then identifies the result with it; the axiom of choice starts 
from what is the result of transfinite induction and identifies a 
process to it. The axiom of induction and the obvious option for 
any finite set to be well-ordered by an equivalent series of 
elementary choices are the corresponding finite analogies of 
transfinite induction and the axiom of choice. 
One can utilize that identification of the process and result 
after the axiom of choice right available in Gödel mathematics 
unlike transfinite induction for removing the “Wittgenstein 
stairs” as follows. If the process can be described by any 
alphabet of four letters, and the process and result are identified 
finite and thus constructive process generating an equivalence of 
finite and transfinite transition.    
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for the axiom of choice, then the result can be also described by 
four letters or “colours”.  
One might object that the process of colouring a map starting 
from its unicolor version needs the axiom of induction or 
transfinite induction rather than both option and axiom of 
choice. This objection is not correct for the axiom of choice is 
applied to the transition between the points of a unicolor area 
to divide it into two neighbouring areas rather than to the set of 
all areas. This is so as transfinite induction above is applied in 
the same way, i.e. between the points of two neighbouring 
areas, just to unify them into a single unicolor one.  
Now, the axiom of choice is necessary for the opposite task: 
to divide points into two areas therefore generating a border 
between them similarly to a “Maxwell demon” distributing 
atoms or molecules in two areas according their velocities or 
energies, or momenta, etc. Indeed, two complementary 
“Maxwell demons” therefore working alternatively can 
reconstruct any state of an ideal gas from an initial state of 
maximal entropy and absolutely equal energies of all atoms or 
molecules. That interpretation of the four colours (or four 
letters) theorem states that those two complementary Maxwell 
demons are sufficient. 
The axiom of choice having available four alternatives or 
two levels of choice generalizes the pair of complementary 
Maxwell demons including the case of colouring any map 
according to the condition of the four colours theorem. 
The four alternatives necessary for the axiom of choice to 
“colour the map” might be elucidated as follows. If any level 
of choice needs two colours to distinguish its element, still two 
“meta-colours” are necessary to distinguish any two 
neighbouring levels, e.g. any two colours for the odd levels, and 
any other two colours for the even levels. Then no neighbouring 
elements (alternatives) as in the one and the same level as in 
two neighbouring levels will share one and the same colour. In 
other words, the other pair of colours are necessary for the next 
level of choice.  
More colours are not necessary because the 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡ℎ level make 
impossible any neighbourhood between levels (𝑛𝑛 − 1)𝑡𝑡ℎ 
and (𝑛𝑛 + 1)𝑡𝑡ℎ. The topology of any map can be exhaustedly 
represented by the alphabet of four alternatives for the axiom 
of choice in virtue of the identification of the process and result 
after it: any map is then the process of dividing the points into 
different areas if the result, from which the axiom of choice 
starts, is the homogenous unicolor (or “grey”) ensemble of all 
points of the map. 
To be avoided any logically suspicious teleology of the 
process of successive choices for dividing the points, one can 
reason so. The axiom of choice accomplishes any possible 
division of the points of the initial “grey” map. It is sufficient 
for proving the theorem in Gödel mathematics that one division 
among all possible ones represents right colouring the map in 
four colours according to the condition of the theorem for the 
theorem states only that the option exists. Then the foresaid 
process will happen randomly among all possible processes 
rather than intentionally, but it is enough for proving the 
theorem   
The main difficulty for understanding is the prejudice that 
the map is not a process, but a result. If one realizes the map 
just as a process, right the process of dividing the points, the 
four colours theorem is almost obvious after the axiom of 
choice. 
That kind of proof of the four colours theorem seeming to 
be a topological one is rather set-theoretical than topological, 
though. The theorem is considered as a topological 
interpretation or an even only topological expression of much 
deeper fundamental dependencies referring to the foundation of 
mathematics, relation of finiteness and infinity, and 
subordination of mathematics and reality. These dependencies 
being philosophical admit anyway a rigorous and properly 
mathematical discussion in the generalizing four letters 
theorem stating that anything can be unambiguously “written 
down” by an alphabet having only four letters. It identifies 
infinity with the non-well-ordered finiteness and elucidates that 
the “atom” of the latter consists of four elements. 
Then and particularly, the “geographical map” can be 
considered as a topological expression of the non-well-ordered 
finiteness and as such, representable by the “letters” of four 
colours. 
Comparing to the properly topological proof, the calculating 
complexity of which needs unconditionally computers, this 
“human” proof resolves the problem by its reinterpretation 
from a much more general viewpoint, from which its 
calculating complexity is minimal and even almost zero. 
Therefor the necessity of computers for the proof is substituted 
by the human capability to change the framework, “gestalt” of 
the problem choosing just that, in which its resolving is as 
simple as possible though challenging prejudices. 
The next paragraphs consider the steps of that general plan 
one by one formally and in detail. 
     
INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION: WHAT A 
MORE DETAILED PAPER WILL CONTAIN: 
Discussing the separable complex Hilbert space and its 
interpretation in quantum mechanics and in theory of 
(quantum) information. 
Demonstrating the correspondence between classical 
information and quantum information as the correspondence 
between the standard and nonstandard interpretation (in the 
sense of Robinson’s analysis) of one and the same structure. 
Elucidating the link between that last structure and Skolem’s 
“relativity of ‘set’” (1922) as the one-to-one mappings of 
infinite sets into finite sets under the condition of the axiom of 
choice.  
Deducing the four letters theorem and interprets the theorem 
as to the physical world after any entity in it might be 
considered as a quantum system. 
 Interpreting the theorem as to mind seen as the set of all 
logics by means of representing the well-orderings in the 
separable complex Hilbert space.  
Discussing the unification of the physical world and mind 
under the denominator of the four-letter theorem.  
Deducing the four colors theorems from the four letters 
theorem including the case of an infinite number of domains by 
attaching ambiguously a wave function to any map (the axiom 
of choice may be excluded for any finite number of domains). 
 
 References in detail are not necessary for only classical, 
well-known papers are meant, for which the author and 
publication year (available in brackets in the text) are 
absolutely sufficient.  
